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The Duty and Right to Follow 
One's Judgment of Conscience 
Germain Grisez 
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University. and the Roman Academic Centre of the Holy Cross. 
University of Navarre. 
The duty to follow one's conscience is neither one specific responsibility 
among others nor a supreme responsibility which perhaps could conflict 
with and nullify others. For no matter what in particular one ought to do, 
one ought to follow one's conscience. That is so because the duty to follow 
conscience is reducible to the duty to do what is morally good . One's 
conscience simply is what one judges to be moral truth considered insofar 
as one has tried to know that truth, thinks one knows it, and compares 
one's prospective or past choices with it. 
"One ought to do what is morally good" is true by definition. But 
although the duty to follow one's conscience is reducible to that tautology, 
we consider it interesting and informative to say: "One ought to follow 
one's judgment of conscience." Why do we consider that worth saying? 
One says that one ought to follow one's judgment of conscience in the 
face of a temptation not to do so. A temptation to do what one believes to 
be wrong often is strengthened, especially if one is under pressure from 
others, by the thought that one's judgment of conscience could be 
mistaken. For example, a law-abiding citizen always hesitates to violate 
the law's requirements, and so if compliance with a law would be morally 
wrong, will reflect: "I know my access to moral truth is not infallible, but I 
am convinced that it would be wrong to comply with this legal 
requirement." In such a situation, "One's duty is to follow one's judgment 
of conscience" means: One ought not to do what one believes to be wrong, 
but, having tried to know the moral truth and thinking that one knows it, 
one should choose and act, despite every contrary pressure. in conformity 
with the moral truth insofar as one has access to it. Thus, the point of 
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saying that one ought to follow one's judgment of conscience is that one 
ought to try to do what is morally good by choosing in conformity with 
what one thinks to be moral truth, although one is aware that one's 
judgment of conscience could be mistaken. 
Since the duty to follow one's conscience is reducible to one's duty to do 
what is morally good, the specific duty pertaining to conscience is to 
"form" it - that is, to do beforehand what one can to avoid making 
mistakes when one judges prospective or past choices by the standard of 
what one thinks to be moral truth. If one does what one thinks is morally 
good, but has failed to form one's conscience, one does not really follow a 
judgment of conscience. Due to one's negligence, one's subjective opinion 
about what is morally good cannot be considered conscience, using 
"conscience" in an unqualified sense. 
Highest Standard of Morality 
Christians and others who acknowledge Abraham as their father in faith 
believe that God's loving wisdom is the highest standard of morality, and 
that He guides those who believe in Him not only by the natural light of 
reason but by faith . Therefore, in forming their consciences, they conform 
their judgments to moral truth derived from this source. 
Among people of faith, some hold that God makes His plan and it will 
be known immediately to each individual by an inner light. Others 
recognize various external means by which God guides His people. All 
Christians believe that the illumination of the Holy Spirit and the inspired 
Scriptures should contribute to the formation of their conscience. 
Catholics believe that divine revelation not only makes known 
specifically Christian moral norms which they could not know without 
faith , but also clarifies and confirms those moral truths which human 
persons can know even without hearing the gospel. Without diminishing 
the factors which all Christians recognize, Catholics believe that they 
receive divine revelation by believing what the Catholic Church believes 
and teaches, and that they can discern what the Church believes and 
teaches by attending to the magisterium. By the authorization of her divine 
founder, the Catholic Church, speaking through her magisterium, teaches 
all her members what they must do to be saved. So, faithful and 
clearheaded Catholics consider the moral guidance offered by the pope 
and the bishops in communion with him to indicate moral truths by which 
they must form their consciences. 
Therefore, for faithful and clearheaded Catholics, the duty to follow 
one's judgment of conscience cannot conflict with the duty to live 
according to the moral teaching which the magisterium proposes. For 
unless they fulfill the latter duty, they have only their own subjective 
opinion to follow, not an authentic judgment of conscience. 
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II. 
Insofar as the duty to follow conscience is reducible to the duty to do 
what is morally good, the right to follow conscience is reducible to the right 
to do what is morally good. Plainly, that is not one specific right among 
others. However, one does have certain specific and limited rights to 
follow one's judgment of conscience - rights which are entailed by the 
duties of others to take into account the fact that one is acting (or wishes to 
act) on a judgment of conscience, rather than on some other basis, and 
therefore to limit themselves in certain ways. 
Those who have power to control the behavior of another person should 
do so only in accord with their own judgment of conscience. In making this 
judgment, they must take into account what the other person may rightly 
do. They may never require the other person to act (or not to act) in a way 
which they themselves believe confliCts with moral truth. But they 
sometimes may require the other person to act (or not to act) in a way 
which the other person thinks conflicts with moral truth - that is, 
contrary to his or her own judgment of conscience. For instance, public 
authorities may prevent a religious body from practicing human sacrifice 
even if members of that body sincerely believe they ought to practice it. 
However, whenever those who have power to control the behavior of 
another person bring it about that the other person acts contrary to his or 
her conscience, serious harm is done in three ways to basic human goods. 
(1) If the other person freely chooses to act contrary to his or her 
conscience, he or she commits sin. (2) Solidarity is harmed insofar as 
submission to or determination by coercion replaces voluntary 
collaboration. (3) Some sorts of acts, such as religious acts, are valueless if 
done unwillingly. For these reasons, those who have power to control the 
behavior of another person sometimes ought not to use their power for the 
precise reason that if they did so, that person would act contrary to his or 
her conscience. For instance, within certain limits public authorities 
should not require anyone to act contrary to his or her conscience in 
matters religious. 
Corresponding to such specific and limited duties of those who have 
power not to use it when doing so would cause another person to act 
contrary to conscience are specific and limited rights of that person to 
follow conscience. Therefore, one does have certain specific and limited 
rights to follow one's judgment of conscience, and all such rights are 
immunities from coercion to act contrary to conscience. 
The magisterium ofthe Catholic Church is a teaching office, not a body 
with the power to control behavior. So, the magisterium cannot compel 
anyone to act contrary to his or her conscience. Moreover, as explained 
above, for faithful and clearheaded Catholics, the duty to follow one's 
judgment of conscience cannot possibly conflict with the duty to live 
according to the moral teaching which the magisterium proposes. Others 
do not consider the moral guidance offered by the pope and other bishops 
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in communion with him to indicate moral truths by which to form their 
consciences. For them, the magisterium simply is irrelevant in questions of 
conscience, and so they need no right to follow their judgment of 
conscience contrary to the magisterium's teaching. Therefore, nobody can 
have a right to follow his or her judgment of conscience contrary to the 
magisterium's teaching. 
III. 
Elsewhere I have argued that the Catholic Church's constant and most 
firm teaching concerning contraception and certain other moral questions 
not only is true, but has been proposed infallibly by the ordinary 
magisterium. From this thesis, a second one follows: Theological dissent 
from such teachings is not justifiable. Here I address my reflections to 
those who either accept these two theses as established or, at least, are 
willing to grant them for the sake of argument. 
Between June, 1964 and the publication of Humanae Vitae in July 1968, 
many Catholics came to believe that the Church's teaching concerning 
contraception was in doubt and that they might follow their own 
"conscience" in this matter. Three factors fostered this belief. 
First, in June, 1964, Pope Paul VI announced the famous Commission 
for the Study of Population, Family, and Births, but he never made clear 
the scope of its mandate . At that time and subsequently he also made 
statements which were widely taken to mean that a change in the Church's 
teaching concerning contraception was possible. In November, 1965, he 
proposed amendments to Gaudium et spes which would have clarified the 
matter, but then allowed the relevant conciliar commission to modify 
those amendments in such a way that Vatican II also seemed to leave an 
opening for the approval of contraception. Moreover, even after 
documents of the papal commission were leaked and published in April, 
1967, and expectations that the teaching would change became more 
widespread and intense, Paul VI allowed fifteen more months to pass 
before he completed his evaluation of the commission's report and issued 
Humanae Vitae. 
Second, during those four years, a growing number of theologians and a 
scattering of bishops expressed their opinion that the Church herself was 
in doubt about the morality of contraception, and that faithful Catholics 
might rightly form judgments of conscience contrary to previous Catholic 
teaching on this matter. The arguments offered for this opinion were weak, 
but to those without theological sophistication they seemed strong, 
especially inasmuch as they were not authoritatively rejected. And so, 
some faithful and clearheaded Catholics became convinced that the 
Church no longer had a firm teaching concerning contraception. Many 
such Catholics had to make choices about contraception. Without 
violating their responsibility to form their consciences, many of them 
reached the judgment of conscience that they might use (or formally 
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cooperate in others' using) contraception and they acted on that judgment. 
Third, during those four years, some theologians and others began to 
spread in the Church a nontraditional conception of conscience. 
Analysis Clarifies 
The analysis in part I, above, makes it clear that for a faithful and 
clearheaded Catholic, there is no right to follow a judgment of conscience 
against the teaching of the magisterium. But in that analysis, "conscience" 
means what one judges to be moral truth considered insofar as one has 
tried to know that truth, thinks one knows it, and compares one's 
prospective or past choices with it. 
However, dominant elements in the societies and cultures of all the 
affluent nations deny that there is any source of meaning and value beyond 
the human. Those who share that view give "conscience" an entirely 
different meaning, according to which conscience becomes merely 
subjective opinion. For the denial of any source of meaning and value 
beyond the human leads to relativism. According to this relativism, moral 
judgments cannot be objectively grounded, and moral norms are nothing 
more than the attempts of societies to control their members and of 
individ uals to influence one another's behavior. In this relativistic context, 
"conscience" refers to the individual's subjective judgment as to what is 
most authentic for himself or herself - what will best serve his or her 
interests in the face of pressures to conform to others' standards. 
Thus, in all the affluent nations, the role in moral life which, according 
to the Christian tradition, rightfully belongs to conscience, all too often is 
played today by merely subjective opinion. In this subjectivist perspective, 
the moral truths handed on throughout the Church's tradition seem to be 
no more than one body of opinion among others. To those who share this 
view, the magisterium seems authoritarian, for they think that it is trying 
to impose its opinion on the faithful in violation of their right to follow 
their autonomous conscience. 
Catholics always are in danger of beginning to conform to the 
unbelieving world in which they live. By the time Humanae Vitae appeared 
in July, 1968, many Catholics in the affluent nations had become confused 
and more or less accepted the subjectivist perspective and its 
nontraditional conception of conscience. Such Catholics came to think 
that even if the Catholic Church were in no doubt they could rightly follow 
their subjective opinion against the moral guidance offered by the pope 
and the bishops in communion with him. This position often was 
expressed by saying that Catholics rightly follow their own judgment of 
conscience even if it conflicts with "official" Church teaching. 
Effects of Theological Dissent 
Much of the theological dissent after Humanae Vitae implicitly 
presupposed, applied, and so consolidated and spread the subjectivist 
conception of conscience which had begun to take hold in the Church. For 
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example, one famous dissenting statement took for granted that the 
teaching reaffirmed in Humanae Vitae is not infallible, claimed that it "is 
common teaching in the Church that Catholics may dissent from 
authoritative, non-infallible teachings of the magisterium when sufficient 
reasons for so doing exist," and concluded that "spouses may responsibly 
decide according to their conscience that artificial contraception in some 
circumstances is permissible and indeed necessary to preserve and foster the 
values and sacredness of marriage." 
In this context, many episcopal conferences issued pastoral statements. 
Most discussed conscience, and several suggested that nonassent to or 
dissent from Humanae Vitae might be licit under certain conditions. While 
virtually everything said in these statements about conscience and dissent 
has some true sense, still many people were misled by them. Why this 
happened can be understood from the following observation. 
Normally, conscience becomes a subject of reflection when one is thinking 
about someone else's action or one's own past action, or when one must resist 
a temptation to submit to pressure to do what one believes to be wrong. In 
forming one's conscience here and now, one pays attention to the relevant 
moral norms, not to conscience. It follows that when someone seeks pastoral 
guidance, he or she wants to know what the Church believes is truly the 
morally good thing to do. If one responds by saying that a person who 
follows a sincere conscience is morally blameless, the remarks can be mis-
leading. It is true, but the truth about conscience is not what is being asked 
for. The question is: What should I think I may do? The question is not: If I 
do what I think I should but happen to be mistaken, then how do I stand? 
Thus, when an adviser in a pastoral situation talks simultaneously about 
conscience and about the moral norms proposed by the Church, the talk 
about conscience is likely to be mistaken for talk about one's substantive 
moral responsibilities. The teaching on conscience does not form conscience 
(that is, help one to know the relevant moral truth); it merely says that if one 
blamelessly thinks doing X is morally good, then choosing to do X is 
blameless. 
But this truism is likely to be taken as significant and to be misinterpreted 
to mean: "If you think that doing X is morally unobjectionable, and if you 
are blameless in having come to think so, then I, as your pastor, assure you 
that you may do X blamelessly." In other words: "If you think anything is 
morally good, then it is morally good for you." Thus, inappropriate talk 
about conscience is likely to be understood by the faithful as an endorsement 
of subjectivism. 
Understanding of Bishops' Statements 
Several of the statements issued by bishops' conferences in response to 
Humanae Vitae were widely understood in this way. Two factors reinforced 
this understanding: first, some of the statements were poorly formulated 
and / or included approval of dissent; second, many dissenting theologians 
invoked the bishops' statements to support theological dissent and the 
18 Linacre Quarterly 
and the subjectivism it fostered. 
Bishops' statements which did not approve dissent and which spoke 
carefully of conscience were not misinterpreted. Dissenting theologians 
quietly ignored those statements which clearly taught that one's duty is to 
form one's conscience and that for Catholics that means conforming to the 
divine law, which is unfolded by the magisterium. But several of the 
collective bishops' statements were framed in such a way that they could be 
read as suggesting that a Catholic who had formed a judgment of 
conscience at odds with the teaching which Humanae Vitae reaffirmed 
could rightly continue to follow that judgment simply because it had been a 
judgment of conscience. The bishops who made these statements avoided 
dissenting openly from what Paul VI reaffirmed, but in doing so they 
unintentionally encouraged subjectivism. 
Many dissenting theologians claimed that at least some of the bishops' 
statements amounted to an endorsement of their dissent, including that 
dissent's encouragement that Catholics consider their subjective opinion to 
be a judgment of conscience which they might rightly follow against the 
magisterium. This claim of the dissenting theologians gained credibility, 
because time passed and the confusion created by the bishops' statements 
never was cleared up - either by the episcopal conferences, by the synod of 
bishops, or by the Holy See. 
With the magisterium of the Church in this state, dissenting theologians 
were able to consolidate their position. Eventually, many theologians, 
including some of the best known in the world, argued that the 
magisterium's lack of unity and its toleration of theological dissent 
constituted consent by silence both to theological dissent and to the 
subjectivist conception of conscience dissent had fostered . 
Once these positions were established, theological dissent quickly spread 
to many other received Catholic moral teachings related to sex, marriage, 
and innocent life. Eventually, many dissenting theologians claimed both 
that no specific moral norm can be taught infallibly and that every specific 
moral norm is open to exceptions. 
IV. 
As the analysis of part I , above, showed, faithful and clearheaded 
Catholics will find no inconsistency between their duty to follow their 
judgment of conscience and their duty to live according to the teaching 
which the magisterium proposes. And neither for such Catholics nor for 
anyone else does it make sense to talk about an authentic right to follow 
conscience against the magisterium's teaching, since the magisterium 
cannot coerce anyone. Nevertheless, many Catholics today are uncertain or 
confused about their duty to follow their judgment of conscience formed by 
the teaching the magisterium proposes. 
In the midst of dissent and the confusion to which it led , Popes Paul VI 
and John Paul II continued to propose received Catholic moral teaching 
firmly and clearly. The present Pope also has worked hard to explain and 
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clarify those moral norms which have been attacked most heavily. In doing 
so, he has made a powerful case that the norm concerning contraception 
pertains to the moral order revealed by God. Some bishops and groups of 
bishops also have taught clearly and firmly enough to leave no doubt that 
they believe that the Church's moral teaching on contraception and on 
other disputed matters is true and that the faithful should conform their 
consciences to it. 
However, the clarity and firmness of this substantive teaching does not 
help those many Catholics who have adopted a subjectivist notion of 
conscience. For them, the moral truth which the Church teaches is merely 
a set of opinions from which they can pick and choose. Sometimes, 
perhaps, such subjectivism is a sign of bad faith and an expression of an 
apostate heart; nothing the magisterium can do is likely to help such 
Catholics to regain their moral balance. But sometimes subjectivism is a 
sign of poor catechesis and more or less innocent confusion, and in such 
cases the magisterium needs to do better than it has during the past 
twenty-five years. 
Moreover, clear and firm moral teaching by the popes and some of the 
bishops, while essential and quite helpful, has not been adequate to the 
needs even of those Catholics who have avoided subjectivism and 
remained faithful and clearheaded . For they look to the magisterium both 
for guidance in forming their own consciences and for support in teaching 
and handing on the way of the Lord Jesus to others, especially to children. 
But they find the guidance and support they look for obscured and 
weakened by the lack of unity in the magisterium itself. 
Heritage of Division and Confusion 
What bishops and conferences of bishops, theologians and groups of 
theologians said in 1968-69 has not gone away. It remains with us today as 
a heritage of division and confusion. The 1980 session of the Synod and the 
splendid apostolic exhortation, Familiaris consortio. superseded the 
inadequate or defective elements contained in some of the pastoral 
statements published soon after Humanae Vitae. Yet that splendid 
collegial effort failed to restore solidarity even to the magisterium itself, 
because the reality and depth of division never was frankly acknowledged, 
much less confronted and overcome. 
But the division in the magisterium is real. Against the clear and firm 
moral teaching of the popes and some of the bishops, some other bishops 
quietly but clearly accept and foster dissenting opinions. They never 
straightforwardly and firmly assert Catholic teaching on the disputed 
questions, and if they do not openly reject that teaching, they do consult 
and follow the advice of dissenting theologians, invite such theologians to 
instruct their priests , appoint these theologians to teach their seminarians 
and direct their marriage preparation programs, and make it clear that 
they reject the "narrowness" and "rigidity" of "official teaching" in favor of 
a pluralism which admits dissenting opinions and encourages subjectivist 
20 Linacre Quarterly 
consciences to follow them. 
Somehow and sometime, the collegial magisterium, under the 
leadership of John Paul II or a later pope, must confront and overcome 
this division. The issues raised in 1968-69 must be clarified and resolved. 
Only then will a reunified magisterium be able to propose more credibly 
the true meaning of the duty to follow one's judgment of conscience and so 
help to save the faithful from the quicksand of subjectivism into which so 
many have been led by theological dissent and by the inadequacies of the 
magisterium's response to it. 
Furthermore, pending reunification of the magisterium, that part of it 
which continues to hold and teach the Church's constant and most firm 
moral teaching - and in what follows I shall be concerned only with those 
who make up that part of the magisterium - needs to avoid crossing the 
fine line which divides justifiably tolerating dissent from unjustifiably 
cooperating with it. Despite everything, some Catholics have resisted 
subjectivism and have remained faithful and clearheaded. The question is: 
Just how much can a bishop accept without failing in his duty to help such 
Catholics to form their own consciences and to meet their responsibility of 
handing on their Christian way of life to others? 
First, one must recognize that many things are done in a diocese which 
simply are beyond the control of the bishop, and similarly many things are 
done in the Catholic world which simply are beyond the control of the 
pope. Whenever that is literally true, no question even oftoleration arises, 
since one cannot tolerate that over which one has no control. In such cases, 
bishops must choose between denouncing error and not mentioning it but 
serenely, clearly, and firmly teaching and explaining the truth. The latter 
course has many advantages, but when it is chosen and the Church's 
constant and most firm moral teaching is reaffirmed, its authoritativeness 
and exclusive legitimacy ought to be emphasized. Otherwise, dissenting 
theologians will say - and even some faithful and clearheaded Catholics 
will be led to believe - that the error which is not expressly denounced is a 
licit theological opinion which may be followed in practice. 
Second , many actions are carried on in a diocese or in the Catholic 
world which are in various ways subject to the bishop's or pope's authority 
but do not precisely participate in and exercise his authority. For example, 
in some parts of the world many Catholic media of communication and 
institutions of higher education are autonomous entities whose operations 
clearly are in no way operations of the bishops. In a different but 
analogous way, the acts of other bishops are not the acts of the pope. In 
such cases, pastoral leaders must choose between using the authority they 
have to try to prevent or put a stop to dissent and not using that authority 
and so tolerating dissent. Plainly, as long as division in the magisterium 
continues, the Holy See has little choice but to tolerate widespread dissent. 
Regarding the Holy See as their model of pastoral leadership, other 
bishops naturally tend not to use their authority against dissent, but rather 
try to contain it by exhortation and administrative maneuvers. 
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Legitimate Teaching 
But third, no one legitimately teaches in the Church except by sharing in 
the teaching authority of the popes and other bishops. Many priests and 
others who openly dissent from the Church's constant and most firm 
moral teaching exercise teaching roles in the Church by virtue of episcopal 
authorization. Can a bishop be acting consistently if he tolerates dissent by 
those who share by virtue of his authorization in his own teaching office? 
Of course, he can remain consistent if he does not know that his 
authorization is being abused to teach dissent or if, knowing about the 
abuse, he simply cannot withdraw the authorization which he previously 
gave. But setting such cases aside, I do not see how a bishop can be acting 
consistently if he tolerates dissent by those who share in his teaching office 
with his own continuing authorization. For when a pastor continues to 
authorize others to teach and preach, knowing what they are doing, lie is 
personally responsible for what they do with his authorization. Acting in 
and through those who teach and preach with his authorization, the pastor 
somehow cooperates with dissent when he continues to authorize the 
teaching and preaching of those whom he knows very well to be engaging 
in it. 
Sensing this to be so, the faithful- and even the non believing world -
assume that bishops do not unconditionally exclude those positions which 
they knowingly allow others to teach with their authority. The 
inconsistency is especially plain when theologians who openly dissent from 
the Church's constant and most firm moral teaching are continued in their 
posts, year after year, in seminaries and ecclesiastical facuIties. True, not 
every dissenting theologian has been allowed to continue teaching with the 
authorization of his bishop. But many have been. In this matter, too, other 
bishops who personally hold and teach what Rome does, tend to consider 
acceptable what they see being done in Rome. 
My point is not that dissenters who exercise various offices in the 
Church are abusing those offices and should be disciplined for doing so. 
That may be true, but it also may be true that most dissenters are in good 
faith and do not deserve punishment. My present point is not even that 
those who dissent from the Church's teaching on sex, marriage, and 
innocent life are denying truths which pertain to faith and leading people 
into sins and other great evils. I believe that is so, but the point I am now 
making would hold even if the Church's teaching were false and the 
opinions which dissent from it were based on a fresh divine revelation - as 
some who hold those opinions suggest by their talk of the Holy Spirit's 
work in the "sense of the faithful." 
A Pastor's Responsibility 
My point, rather, is that a pastor who believes the Church's teaching 
true and who faithfully teaches and preaches it also simultaneously himself 
undercuts that teaching when he does not withdraw his authorization to 
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teach and preach from those whom he knows are using it to teach and 
preach dissenting opinions. Such a pastor is hardly acting consistently, 
and I can think of no justification for that inconsistency. Moreover, 
inconsistency in this matter is grave, for by it a pastor both personally calls 
the faithful to conform their lives to difficult norms which concern grave 
matters and allows his authority to be abused by others whose dissent 
encourages the same faithful to do what their pastor continues to teach to 
be a gra ve sin. (Of course, only God knows the state of a pastor's heart; like 
anyone else, he may be guilty of little or nothing due to lack of sufficient 
reflection.) 
Consequently, I believe that the following is a true moral norm: Every 
one of the Church's pastors should make it clear to all those who have his 
authorization to preach and teach that he cannot and will not tolerate their 
using that authorization to dissent from Catholic teachings which he 
himself accepts . Instead , as soon as it becomes evident that anyone having 
his authorization preaches or teaches dissenting opinions, he will 
withdraw the authorization, not to punish the dissenter, but to act 
consistently as a pastor. I respectfully ask only this of the pastors of the 
Church: that they consider whether this norm is indeed true and binding 
on their consciences. 
In a letter to Charles Curran, Sept. 17, 1986, Cardinal Ratzinger, as 
Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, wrote: "It must 
be recognized that the authorities of the Church cannot allow the present 
situation to continue in which the inherent contradiction is prolonged that 
one who is to teach in the name of the Church in fact denies her teaching" 
(Origins, 15 [1986], 668). I believe Cardinal Ratzinger's argument is 
entirely sound. Indeed, what I have been trying to show is that everyone of 
the Church's pastors should apply a similar argument in respect to every 
individual whom he in any way authorizes to share in his pastoral ministry 
of teaching and preaching. Inconsistency which Rome rightly finds 
intolerable in Washington can hardly be tolerable in any other part of the 
Church, least of all in Rome itself. 
Despite everything that has happened, faithful and clearheaded 
Catholics who have not been seduced by subjectivism still know that to 
fulfill their duty to follow their judgment of conscience, they must form 
their conscience by conforming to God's law, submissive to the 
magisterium which interprets that law in the light of the Gospel. Yet they 
find it nearly impossible to teach and hand on the way of Jesus to others, 
especially to children, when even the part of the magisterium which 
continues to proclaim it clearly and firmly also inconsistently continues to 
authorize those who teach dissenting opinions. 
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